Broker-dealers play a central role as enablers and facilitators of trades in OTC markets. However, broker-dealers also often engage in the business of providing investment advice, ranging from tailored asset allocation to securities research. Due to this dual role of broker-dealers, regulators are concerned about inherent conflicts of interest that could harm clients. In this paper, I theoretically and empirically examine how the dual role of broker-dealers shapes trading relationships and execution costs in OTC markets.
Work in Progress, 2018

The distributed ledger technology, better known as blockchain, promises fast settlements of transactions on secure ledgers at very low costs. However, while ensuring system security, distributed systems introduce stochastic verification time into the settlement process. We argue that this stochastic latency imposes constraints on price efficiency as it exposes arbitrageurs to price risk. We derive a measure for the contribution of stochastic latency to relative price efficiency and show that it accounts for 37% of observed price differences in Bitcoin markets.
Work in Progress, 2018

We show that in fire sales institutional investors chose to sell bonds that were trading in liquid markets before. Surprisingly, the price drops of these bonds are larger than of bonds that were trading in less liquid markets. We argue that this is because institutions fail to internalize the negative effect selling common bonds has on other market participants. After controlling for commonality of bonds, liquid bonds exhibit smaller price impacts in fire sales. Regulatory measures of systemic risk should thus take into account the portfolio overlap in liquid bonds as it exacerbates fire-sale losses.
Working Paper, 2018

We examine liquidity risks of mutual funds and the role of liquidity management in a parsimonious model of active portfolio management with transaction costs. We argue that redemptions following bad performance pose no dilution risk to remaining investors, and what appears to be liquidity management by mutual funds is managers collecting rent. Bad performance is a negative signal about a manager, it reduces the optimal fund size. Liquidations of illiquid assets to satisfy performance-driven redemptions are efficient and do not justify regulatory interventions. Accommodating redemptions with cash only, as managers with performance-sensitive compensation do, amplifies outflows and destabilizes the fund.
Working Paper, 2018

We provide novel evidence of banks establishing lending relationships with prestigious firms to signal their quality and attract future business. Using survey data on firm-level prestige, we show that lenders compete more intensely for prestigious borrowers and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with prestigious firms. We also find that banks expand their lending after winning prestigious clients. Prestigious firms benefit from these relations as they face lower costs of borrowing even though prestige has no predictive power for credit risk. Our results are robust to matched sample analyses and a regression discontinuity design.
Working Paper, 2017


I was teaching assistant for the following courses:

  • University of Vienna: Calculus, Keynes for Beginners, International Macroeconomics, Macroeconomics and Inequality
  • TU (Vienna University of Technology): Microeconomics
  • Gutman Private Welath Management Seminar: FinTech
  • WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business): Linear Algebra

Some useful notes for students: